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negative views of one another. In addition, there is spillover in terms of the assessment of 
associated language groups. However, there is a group of moderates in between the two policy 
poles that limit the extent of this polarization. Contrary to common wisdom, these moderates have 
very stable preferences. Our results contribute to the understanding of the underexplored 
polarization dynamics of secessionist movements, particularly in places where high-intensity 
violence (i.e. terrorism, civil war) has not yet occurred. 
Key words: Catalonia, conflict, independence movements, polarization, secessionism  
JEL classification: D72, D74, H89, Y80 
Acknowledgements: We are grateful for financial support from Duke University, Georgetown 
University, and the Christ Church (University of Oxford) Research Fund, and for assistance from 
staff at Respondi. For their helpful feedback we thank Alan Arwine, Kanisha Bond, Florian Foos, 
Aina Gallego, Patricia Justino, Nikitis Konstantinidis, Carolina de Miguel Moyer, Sarah Parkinson, 
Ruben Ruiz-Rufino, audiences at the annual meetings of the American Political Science 
Association, Midwest Political Science Association, and European Political Science Association, 
and seminar participants at the Juan March conferencia de doctores and the DC area comparative 
politics workshop, as well as the University of Toronto, University of Maryland, and King’s College 
London. 
This study is published within the UNU-WIDER project Inequality and governance in unstable 
democracies—the mediating role of trust, implemented by a consortium led by Institute of 
Development Studies (IDS). The support of the UK Economic and Social Research Council 





An enduring concern in many democracies is how to address regional autonomy or secessionist 
movements. Such demands pit conflicting values of territorial integrity or constitutional 
compliance against those of self-determination. While the current political impasse in Spain 
regarding the independence drive in Catalonia is the most salient example in the Western press, 
secessionist movements have recently been or are still relevant in many democratic or quasi-
democratic countries (e.g. Canada, India, Indonesia, Russia, the United Kingdom) (Cunningham 
2014; Griffiths 2016). The literature on such movements and their associated political parties has 
concentrated on their origins, success, and potential for violence; more recent literature has begun 
to consider more thoroughly the individual-level correlates of support for such movements and 
parties. But a key feature of these movements that remains less understood is the corresponding 
affective polarization or inter-group animus that can occur within the contested regions. In much 
of the secessionist and civil conflict literature, the existence of group polarization is assumed to be 
a cause of conflict, but to date proper theorization and empirical tests of how much and what 
forms of polarization are relevant in these contexts has been limited.  
Social polarization is a problematic aspect of independence movements and counter-movements 
because it can escalate distrust and prevent peaceful resolution of the conflict.1 Even though 
polarization is a fundamental aspect of civil conflict and scholars recognize that identity activation 
can be endogenous to conflict (Dragojevic 2019; Fearon and Laitin 2000; Gagnon 2004; Kalyvas 
2008), there is limited literature on this phenomenon in secessionist contexts, and evidence from 
situations where there is not yet violence is scarce.   
In this paper, we test hypotheses about the existence of secession-based polarization, and present 
a design that permits the discrete measurement of individual-level political preferences and social 
polarization during an ongoing push for secession in an advanced democracy. The design builds 
on a straightforward theoretical proposition that policy differences over secession can be the basis 
of negative out-group (and positive in-group) evaluations and stereotyping; we categorize such 
attitudes as social or affective polarization (Mason 2015, 2018). This type of polarization is often 
assumed in many theoretical and empirical studies of conflict but is generally unmeasured. We 
argue that supporters and opposers of secession can polarize by expressing comfort (discomfort) 
with people who share (oppose) their territorial views. We further hypothesize the possibility of 
stereotyping people who support the opposing policy, as well as groups (e.g., ethnic, national, 
regional, religious/sectarian, linguistic, tribal) associated with the policy. We contend that those 
with intermediate policy preferences (i.e. moderates on the policy issue) will be less likely to exhibit 
such differences in affect and stereotyping. Our design and evidence draw on the literatures of 
secession, political polarization, and out-group stereotyping; to date, the latter two agendas have 
been largely separated from the first. 
We use evidence from the current most salient and challenging case of secession in advanced 
industrial democracies, Catalonia. The crisis in Spain posed by the Catalan independence 
movement is arguably the most serious sustained challenge to Spanish democracy since the 
country’s regime transition in the late 1970s. The region experienced peaceful protests as well as 
violent clashes between protestors and regional and national police in October 2019, 
 
1 We subscribe to existing definitions of social or affective polarization as the degree of relative affect (like or dislike) 
of another group. See, for example, Iyengar et al. (2012: 405–31). In the next section we differentiate the different 
uses of ‘polarization’ to motivate our hypotheses and design. 
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predominantly in the largest cities (Barcelona, Girona, Lleida, and Tarragona), after the Supreme 
Court (Tribunal Constitucional ) sentenced independentist leaders for sedition and other crimes. 
However, Catalonia is a ‘negative’ case of a violent civil conflict despite high tensions and state 
rejection of the movement (Balcells et al. 2020; Barceló 2018). Unlike cases in which secessionist 
campaigns have escalated into violence (e.g., Corsica, East Timor, Yugoslavia), the conflict in 
Catalonia has remained broadly non-violent, despite violence that has occurred at low-intensity 
levels, mainly in the form of police and protest violence. As some conflict scholars have 
emphasized (Straus 2015; Wood 2008), negative cases are particularly instructive about the causes 
of violence. Our study delves into the measurement and dynamics of polarization in a case that 
has not escalated into violent conflict using a clear design and novel data, collected at the peak of 
the (non-violent) conflict, that allow measurement of polarization. Evidence from the Catalan case 
is particularly relevant because it can support theorizing about scope conditions under which 
polarization can lead to violence, as it is one of the cases where violence has not yet escalated; we 
return to such conditions in the conclusion.  
To study social polarization in Catalonia, we designed a unique, large, regionally representative 
survey in the region. The online survey was fielded in the period between the controversial 
referendum on 1 October 2017 and the extremely contested and salient regional elections in late 
December 2017. The elections were called by the Spanish government after the unprecedented 
activation of Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution that imposed direct rule from the Spanish 
government in response to the regional government’s declaration (albeit ‘non-pursuit’) of 
independence. Independence was the main issue during that electoral campaign. As a robustness 
check and to assess for the persistence of such effects, we fielded a second wave in September 
2018, re-interviewing over 60 per cent of the respondents. This follow-up allowed us to measure 
over-time variation in independence views and social polarization. 
We measure support for independence, and potential affective polarization by ascertaining 
comfort with and assessments of fellow citizens who have various traits, chiefly their language 
group and their position on the independence issue. To elicit causal effects as well as to counter 
issues raised by social desirability and survey acquiescence bias, we embed a series of experiments 
that randomize the group assessed by survey participants. 
We obtain the following findings. First, we find that independence supporters and opposers have 
both positive and negative affect for fellow supporters or opposers in the expected directions, and 
that they significantly stereotype the associated language groups (that is, Spanish-speaking for anti-
independence positions, and Catalan-speaking for pro-independence positions). Second, these 
differences, or polarization, are pronounced for advocates of independence and the status quo, 
but are far smaller for individuals who support an intermediate autonomy option. Third, this 
secession-related polarization is persistent over time and is significantly greater than polarization 
over other salient policy areas.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the motivating literature and describes our 
theoretical propositions. Section 3 reviews recent events in Catalonia and puts them in historical 
context. Section 4 outlines the empirical strategy and presents relevant observational data, followed 
by a presentation of the core experimental results. Section 5 concludes by discussing the 




2 Motivating literature 
Our study is motivated by claims in the literatures of the politics of secession movements and 
political polarization that have remained largely untested. Much existing research on the politics 
of secessionism is on cross-regional or national variation, focusing on why autonomy movements 
are politically successful (Cunningham 2013; Hale 2008; Sambanis and Milanovic 2014; Sorens 
2005) or why self-determination movements may lead to political violence (Brancati 2006; 
Wimmer 2002). The general approach is to test national- and regional-level covariates to see which 
variables matter for certain outcomes at those levels, such as decentralizing institutions, the 
prominence of regional parties, strategies of the state, and regional wealth. A growing set of studies 
addresses why individuals support either greater decentralization or independence in specific cases 
(Amat 2012; Hierro and Queralt forthcoming; Muñoz and Tormos 2015; Rodón and Guinjoan 
2018; Sarigil and Karakoc 2016; Serrano 2013). Many of these studies find that individuals who 
identify strongly with the region or relevant regional-ethnic group, due to family origins or aspects 
of the education system, are generally most supportive of autonomy or independence. Of course, 
given the highly correlated nature of many individual-level characteristics, disentangling those that 
are the most causally relevant is difficult.  
These two general approaches to explaining secession, however, neglect an important research 
question: whether and how secessionism is linked to social division or social polarization within 
the originating region. If affective polarization based around secessionist views exists and is 
resilient, it could make both escalation into violence more likely and peaceful resolution of such 
conflicts more difficult. Similarly, such polarization could be a factor in sustaining secessionist 
movements. Once a secessionist movement begins, elites can have incentives to ‘ethnicize’ or 
nationalize the conflict so that views of the conflict further divide along group membership lines 
(Brancati 2006; Fearon and Laitin 2000; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972).  
To motivate our hypothesis and design about secession-based polarization, we draw on two related 
literatures and identify their lacunae: one on civil conflict and the other on group stereotyping. 
Regarding the first, the relevance of social polarization to explain violent conflict or conflict 
escalation is clear from recent findings. These studies use cross-national evidence to find that 
polarization among ethnic groups is positively correlated with both the onset and the duration of 
civil conflict, as opposed to levels of ethnic fractionalization (Esteban and Schneider 2008). Such 
polarization measures are frequently constructed using individual-level data about which ethnic 
group people claim to be members of, and are defined such that polarization means an increased 
extent to which the population is clustered around a small number of distant poles; country-level 
polarization is most frequently measured simply as a mechanical feature of the distribution of 
group sizes.2  
But a persistent challenge in the measurement of polarization from these conflict studies is that 
the existence and degree of in-group positive affect and out-group animus—or how group-
calculated polarization is supposed to facilitate conflict—cannot be inferred from structural 
calculations of polarization based on demographic composition. Put simply, much of the literature 
linking demographic ‘polarization’ to the possibility of conflict assumes ‘affective or social 
polarization’ as the key variable, but does not actually measure it. Of course, much qualitative 
evidence indicates that conflict situations are frequently linked with negative stereotypes and 
 
2 These studies differ regarding the emphasis on economic inequalities among groups in terms of explaining conflict 
outbreak. Empirical work draws on a family of political economy models where higher polarization is linked with 
bargaining failure. Esteban and Schneider (2008) present an overview of competing measures.   
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grievances against groups, leading to mistrust. In his 1985 classic, Horowitz gives many examples 
of how ethnic conflict causes group stereotypes and mistrust (Horowitz 1985: 167–70), and recent 
studies find that such group views are themselves often endogenous to conflict dynamics 
(Dragojevic 2019; Fearon and Laitin 2000; Gagnon 2004; Kalyvas 2008). Since polarization 
measures are calculated on the basis of individual-level group affiliation, in a context of secessionist 
mobilization, such identity affiliations themselves could be the result of the shadow of conflict. It 
is thus challenging, if not impossible, to measure how a secessionist drive or conflict affects 
polarization and related group affect ex post, and thus valuable to obtain measurements of 
polarization in periods of tension.  
In contrast to the civil conflict literature, which generally measures country-level polarization via 
group membership data, a long tradition in social psychology specifically measures the extent of 
in-group affect or out-group animus, even among groups that are non-ethnic.3 A recent 
contribution to this is literature on US partisanship, which documents the extremity of US affective 
partisan polarization.4 Mason (2015, 2018) shows that US identity-based partisan polarization has 
increased because of the greater sorting of various identity groups into partisan groups and the 
corresponding decline of cross-cutting identities.5 This research documents the many ‘everyday’ 
psychological and emotional individual bases of such group animi, and the ease with which in-
group identity or hostility towards out-groups can be experimentally manipulated. But most of 
such evidence comes from subjects in countries where group-based conflict is not on the horizon, 
and measurement of stereotyping as it relates to secessionism is absent.6  
Given the above, it should be clear that what is needed in the study of secession dynamics is 
measurement of affective polarization when secession has become a salient political issue. The 
literature to date lacks consideration of affective polarization that can result from support for or 
opposition to secession. As secessionist claims relate to a fundamental view of the functioning of 
the polity, they are a likely basis of affective polarization, such that pro- versus anti-independence 
individuals will have negative assessments of those with opposing policy positions and positive 
assessments of those with similar positions. We also conjecture that secessionist claims themselves 
can shape division along associated group lines; division over secession can be correlated with 
corresponding polarization and stereotyping regarding evaluations of groups not directly related 
to independence.7  
 
3 See Miller and Torcal (2020) for a review of affective polarization in Spain, measured with feelings towards political 
parties.  
4 For a recent review, see Iyengar et al. (2019).  
5 We return to the relevance of social sorting in the design and conclusion, but for now our interest is in polarization 
based on a policy, whereas much of the recent research on affective polarization in the US is on how partisanship is 
not based on strong considerations of policy interests.  
6 A representative US example of activating group stereotypes can be seen in Wittenbrink et al. (2001). A few studies 
demonstrate the ease of identity-priming in areas where civil or ethnic conflict has occurred in post-conflict contexts; 
see Chang and Peisakhin (2019), Mashuri and Leeuwen (2018). In-depth studies of polarization processes during the 
escalation of conflict and outbreak of violence in the Baltics and the Balkans are to be found in Gagnon (2004) and 
Petersen (2002). 
7 Such affective polarization would indicate the extent to which support for various territorial preferences represents 
a meaningful group affiliation. While recent definitions of polarization distinguish ideological or policy-based 
polarization from affective polarization, we are interested in how support of or opposition to a particular salient policy 
(i.e. secession) conditions views of other citizens and encourages the formation of stereotypes. We take the policy 
disagreement as the starting point and basis for thinking of policy advocacy as a kind of identity that can have 
consequences akin to other types of group identification.  
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Concretely, we expect that, on average, supporters of an independence policy position (whether it 
is pro- or anti-secession) will evaluate co-supporters most favourably and opposers least 
favourably. We also expect that supporters of a territorial position will evaluate the closest 
‘associated’ ethnic group more favourably than the ethnic group that is not associated with the 
preferred policy position. This polarization in terms of affect and associated stereotypes is most 
likely to emerge among individuals who hold strong positions on the secession issue. Individuals 
who hold an intermediate policy position will be less likely to evaluate others holding different 
preferences negatively, and less likely to stereotype based on affiliated language groups. Further, 
we conjecture that the persistence of a group with an ‘intermediate’ policy position helps prevent 
polarization from escalating into conflict. 
While the endogenous formation and hardening of group identities has been studied in violent 
contexts, we have little evidence of how these processes unfold in the context of secessionist 
conflicts that to date fall short of violence.8 As noted, most empirical evidence about group 
polarization dynamics has been gathered ex post, when a violent conflict has occurred or is well 
under way, not earlier, at times where polarization has initially increased (such as our study). The 
‘real time’ strengthening of positions and ethnicization of a conflict are empirically challenging to 
identify. If territorial-policy-based polarization among groups exists, it is important to assess its 
magnitude, and to evaluate whether such division spills into animosity towards fellow citizens. 
This study contributes to the literature in this regard. 
3 Background to the Catalan case 
Contemporary Catalan nationalism has its roots in the late 19th century (Balcells 2013). In the early 
1930s, Catalonia had some autonomy within Spain, with institutions of self-rule. During the 
Franco dictatorship, cultural rights for national minorities in Spain (i.e. Basques, Catalans, 
Galicians) were repressed, and Spanish nationalism was fiercely promoted by state institutions. 
After the process of devolution began with the transition to democracy in the late 1970s, aspects 
of self-government in Catalonia were restored in a regional governance system called the ‘State of 
the Autonomies’. Authority over healthcare and education provision, among other policies, was 
transferred to subnational parliaments and governments, but this form of federalism was 
incomplete (Beramendi 2012), mostly because of a lack of ‘shared rule’ institutions to guarantee 
the effective participation of subnational units in central policy-making. Limited tax autonomy 
incentivized fiscal irresponsibility, and national laws and institutions often restricted the autonomy 
of regional units. Contestation about revenue transfer from regions to the centre has been a 
longstanding issue, partly because decentralization has been uneven among regions, with the 
Basque Country and Navarra regions enjoying a distinct fiscal arrangement. This differential level 
of regional fiscal autonomy and a broader desire for increased political autonomy, along with 
identity concerns (including language policy) has caused tensions between the Catalan and Spanish 
governments (Colomer 1998).  
In the early 2000s, demands for further decentralization in Catalonia accelerated, and a coalition 
government proposed a new Statute of Autonomy that would recognize Catalonia as a nation 
within Spain, institute more concrete protection of regional competences against interference from 
the central government, and implement a new method of allocating fiscal resources between 
 
8 In Criado et al. (2018), the authors document variation in inter-ethnic trust in Catalonia using lab experiments with 
university students, though their evidence dates from before independence became an explicit political campaign issue 
and prior to greater mobilization.  
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Catalonia and the rest of Spain. After much negotiation, the new Statute was approved by the 
Catalan Parliament and the Spanish Parliament, and finally ratified in a referendum in Catalonia in 
June 2006. Four years later, however, in a controversial decision, the Spanish Constitutional Court 
declared certain provisions of this Statute unconstitutional, most notably the recognition of 
Catalonia as a nation and the ‘competence shielding’ of regional policies. In response, some Catalan 
political parties began to advocate for a referendum for independence, which found increased 
support among the population (Rico and Liñeira 2014). 
The economic recession beginning in 2008 and the victory of the conservative (and more 
centralist) Partido Popular (PP) in the general election of 2011 likely helped increase support for 
independence; around half the Catalan population claimed support for independence in 2014. 
Some argue that this secessionist mobilization and subsequent ethnic polarization was mainly an 
elite-driven process (Barrio and Rodriguez-Teruel 2017); others contend that it was a bottom-up 
movement (Guibernau 2013). Regardless, social movements in favour of independence became 
stronger, evidenced by massive rallies calling for a self-determination referendum in the region.9  
After the 2010 ruling, the Catalan government continued to press for negotiation with the central 
government for a new governance structure, and then insisted on a self-determination referendum. 
The Spanish government rejected this on constitutional grounds, and the Catalan government 
called for a plebiscitary election in 2015, or a regional parliamentary election in which pro-
independence forces would have as a single element at the top of their programme the unilateral 
pursuit of independence of the region (Orriols and Rodón 2016). The pro-independence coalition 
of parties under the moniker ‘Together for Yes’ (JxSi) won 44.4 per cent of the votes and the pro-
independence extreme-left CUP won an additional 3.5 per cent, which gave pro-independence 
forces a majority of 71 seats in the regional parliament, though they fell short of the 50 per cent 
popular support threshold. Whether a mandate for independence had been obtained was therefore 
controversial, and the new government chose the option of pursuing a unilateral referendum of 
independence. The regional government passed a set of laws on 6–7 September 2017 that set a 
self-determination referendum for 1 October, intending to ‘disconnect’ Catalan legality from the 
Spanish system if a majority voted for independence.  
Despite the Spanish Constitutional Court declaring this referendum law unconstitutional and 
central government warnings about legal consequences, the regional government proceeded with 
the referendum on 1 October. This led to an unprecedented crackdown by Spanish police forces 
as they attempted to shut down polling stations (Balcells et al. 2020; Barceló 2018). Scenes of police 
attacks on referendum voters and non-violent protesters became prominent in Western media. 
The crisis continued after the referendum, with the Catalan premier Carles Puigdemont declaring 
independence on 10 October (but revoking this declaration immediately afterwards), the Catalan 
Parliament voting a resolution for declaring Catalonia independent of Spain on 27 October 
(although with no operational effect), and the Spanish Senate quickly voting for the temporary 
suspension of autonomy of Catalonia, activating a Constitutional clause (Article 155) that allows 
the state to take control of a region if it ‘fails to fulfil the obligations imposed upon it by the 
Constitution’. The application of Article 155 dissolved the Catalan Parliament and disbanded the 
Catalan government, and the central government called for new regional elections, which were 
held on 21 December 2017. 
 
9 On 9 November 2014, a non-binding and non-official referendum was held in collaboration with the regional 
government; over 80 per cent of the 2.3 million voters who participated (37 per cent of the electoral census) supported 
an independent Catalan state. 
 
7 
In the December 2017 elections, the anti-independence party Ciudadanos (Citizens) won a plurality 
with 25.3 per cent of the vote. However, the three pro-independence parties, which together 
obtained a vote share of 48.5 per cent, secured another parliamentary majority. A pro-
independence government led by Quim Torra was invested in 2018, as Puigdemont remained 
outside the country due to an outstanding Spanish arrest warrant. While some pro-independence 
leaders and social activists such as Jordi Cuixart, Jordi Sanchez, Quim Forn, and Oriol Junqueras 
had been in prison since October or November 2017, others (such as Raul Romeva, Carme 
Forcadell, and Dolors Bassa), who had been freed on bail before the elections, were remanded in 
custody again on 23 March 2018. All of them were to be tried for sedition by the Spanish Supreme 
Court. 
In June 2018, the PSOE leader Pedro Sánchez won a motion of no-confidence in the Spanish 
Congress and became President, replacing the conservative Mariano Rajoy. In October 2019, after 
the conviction for sedition and sentencing to between nine and thirteen years’ imprisonment 
(depending on other related charges) of eleven politicians and two social organizers, mass 
demonstrations and violent protests occurred in Catalonia. In October 2020, several activists were 
detained for allegedly organizing some of these protests.  
The lack of resolution of the Catalan conflict has ended ‘consensual politics’ in Catalonia, and has 
affected Spanish political competition; Vox, a new far-right Spanish nationalist party, substantially 
increased its electoral success in 2018 with national support of over 10 per cent, partly as a result 
of the Catalan issue.10 Negotiations between the Spanish and Catalan governments began in late 
2019, but they are currently stalled due to the COVID-19 crisis.  
4 Empirical design 
The above background indicates that Catalonia is a natural and important testing ground for 
whether disagreement over regional territorial issues can be the basis of social polarization, and 
whether polarization spills over to the ‘ethnicization’ of the conflict through the formation of 
negative out-group stereotypes. Does disagreement over the independence issue affect evaluations 
of fellow citizens who share such views or are members of different groups? If so, to what extent 
are these views affected? To address these questions, we designed a survey with embedded 
experiments that was fielded between 11 and 20 December 2017, just prior to the regional 
elections. Our representative sample consisted of 2,537 residents of Catalonia aged 18 or older, 
fulfilling age-category and gender quotas. The online survey was fielded in Catalan or Spanish 
(respondents could choose the language).11 To test the stability of preferences and polarization 
after the election and after the re-imprisonment of the independentist leaders, we fielded a follow-
up survey between 19 and 30 September 2018; 63 per cent of respondents to the first survey were 
re-interviewed in the second wave. 
Across both waves, we first assessed the baseline preferences for Catalan independence. The core 
aspect of the design was to embed two distinct experiments designed to measure various aspects 
of social polarization related to independence views. In each experiment we randomly divided the 




11 The surveys were fielded by the company Respondi after we obtained IRB approval. We registered two pre-analysis 
plans (PAP) with EGAP. All the data files used in this paper will be made available as replication files. 
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group affect by randomly asking respondents to assess the comfort of having one of four groups 
as a neighbour. In the ‘stereotype’ experiment, we measured group polarization spillovers by asking 
respondents to describe how well various positive and negative traits describe people who fall into 
one of four groups. In all designs the randomization masks the intent of the design, addresses 
problems of survey acquiescence bias, and prevents potential fatigue from addressing repetitive 
questions.  
In Wave 2, we measured respondent territorial preferences again, and followed the same 
procedures as in Wave 1, assigning respondents to the same treatment groups as in Wave 1. In 
addition, to benchmark our results and degree of polarization, we assessed preferences on other 
highly divisive policies and measured stereotypes of those with the same or different policy 
preferences.  
In our pre-treatment assessment of independence preferences, we asked individuals for their 
preferred political status of Catalonia. The response options were: that they prefer Catalonia to be 
an independent state; that it should have more autonomy; that the status quo should be kept; or 
that Catalonia should have less autonomy. In the first wave, 44 per cent (1,132 respondents) 
indicated a preference for Catalonia to be a separate state, 35 per cent wanted Catalonia to have 
more autonomy, 17 per cent indicated support for the status quo arrangement, and 5 per cent 
preferred less autonomy. We recoded to consider three broad categories: ‘prefer independence’, 
‘greater autonomy’ (but not independence), and ‘the status quo/less autonomy’.12 This tripartite 
coding of independence views is the most straightforward indicator of political views, which we 
use as the key moderator in our subsequent experimental analyses.13 
Table A1 provides basic descriptive statistics of the sample, including independence views, 
language spoken at home, 2017 referendum participation, family origins, education, income, and 
gender.14 The focus of this study is not on the correlates of support for independence, as those 
have been extensively documented,15 but on the regression results of this outcome (Table A2). The 
table corroborates many previous studies of the sources of individual support for Catalan 
independence: controlling for other common demographic variables, we find a strong correlation 
between Catalan identity and support for independence.16  
  
 
12 The status quo and less autonomy categories are merged because these are the two least frequent responses in our 
survey, together comprising only 20 per cent of respondents, and in the Catalan context represent very similar political 
stances.  
13 In our PAP we discuss this as the most relevant moderator, as it comes from observation of Catalan society as being 
divided among individuals who support independence, those who are strongly opposed to it, and those who support 
some intermediate solution. 
14 These figures do not differ from the regional population.  
15 A plethora of studies examine the question of who supports independence; see those discussed above.  
16 Catalan identity is measured in quintiles of a 1–10 scale, with higher values indicating self-identifying as more Catalan 
and lower values as more Spanish. Of course such identity may itself be endogenous to territorial preferences. See 
Table A2 for a discussion. 
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5 Evidence on affective polarization 
5.1 Experiment 1: assessing affect and affect intensity 
We start by testing whether the independence issue polarizes in terms of inter-group animus or 
comfort. That is, given that an individual takes a position on the independence issue, how is her 
view towards other people affected by their position on this issue? We consider one basic measure 
of such affect, and also measure affect in terms of the intensity of independence preferences 
among the individual’s fellow citizens. We do this by measuring the amount of reported comfort 
or discomfort as a result of social proximity to people with differing or similar political positions, 
but varying the intensity of these positions. While we might expect (dis)comfort with (un)like-
minded citizens, we wish to assess if such affect changes with exposure to those with more intense 
preferences. 
To test this, we ask a question about the (dis)comfort that would be induced by having new 
hypothetical neighbours, and we vary the main characteristics of these hypothetical neighbours 
regarding their policy views and the public expression of these policy views, which is a realistic 
way of measuring individual preference intensity. Specifically, we ask respondents how 
comfortable they would be in moving to a place where most of their new neighbours (1) support 
the independence of Catalonia; (2) do not support the independence of Catalonia; (3) display pro-
independence flags; or (4) display Spanish flags. Compared with the first two conditions, the last 
two can be interpreted as indicative of intense preferences, as they are expressed publicly with the 
aim of their being known.17 This design allows a clear assessment of how much positive affect 
there is towards people who take different positions on the independence issue, as well as affect 
towards people who wish to make these preferences visible.18 
Figure 1 displays the results for both waves, decomposed by individuals who are pro-
independence, pro-status quo, and pro-greater autonomy.19 It shows several key patterns that 
confirm considerable affective polarization over the independence issues. Overall, pro-
independence and pro-status quo individuals evaluate like-minded individuals very positively and 
unlike-minded individuals negatively, and they have rather symmetrical reactions in terms of their 
comfort. In the left panel, we consider the views of those who support independence. In the 
condition where the pro-independence advocates view potential neighbours who share their 
position, the reported mean comfort level is 93 out of 100. The pro-independence advocates’ view 
of hypothetical anti-independence neighbours drops to a considerably lower score of 45 (p<0.01); 
this score is below the neutral score of 50. The comfort score for living with neighbours who 
would show the Catalan independentist flag is 91, not distinguishable from the ‘baseline’ high score 
of 93 for neighbours who support Catalan independence. Thus, the enthusiasm for those who 
outwardly support independence via the flag and those who are supportive of independence is not 
 
17 The question text and treatment were: ‘Suppose you were moving to a new apartment or house within your 
neighbourhood. How would you feel if most of your neighbours [are against the independence of Catalonia / support 
the independence of Catalonia / display the Catalan independentist flag / display the Spanish flag], on a scale of zero 
to one hundred, where zero means very uncomfortable, and one hundred means very comfortable?’  
18 Asking about flag display is sensible and familiar to respondents in Catalonia, as this is a practice that has become 
increasingly common as a result of the political conflict. In recent years, pro-independence people have popularized 
displaying secessionist flags (Estelada) on the balconies of apartments and houses (Parravano et al. 2015). In addition, 
much anecdotal evidence indicates a rise in the display of Spanish flags within Catalonia (and in other parts of Spain) 
since the 1 October 2017 referendum. See Tables D1 and D2 for balance tests. 
19 Tables B1 and B2 in Appendix B present the regression results. 
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markedly different. Finally, for pro-independence individuals, the lowest comfort score is for 
neighbours who show the Spanish flag: 36 (p<.01). This score is statistically distinguishable from 
and lower than the anti-Catalan independence score of 45 (p<.01). Thus, for pro-independence 
advocates, hypothetical neighbours who display the Spanish flag pose more discomfort than those 
who are just anti-independence. But, again, neighbours who show the Catalan independentist flag 
are not more comfort-inducing than neighbours who are simply pro-independence. 
Figure 1: Evaluation of potential neighbours, by territorial preferences (3 groups) 
Source: authors’ construction. 
The right-most panel shows a similar overall trend for those who are pro-status quo (most anti-
independence), although they have differences in the baseline degree of comfort. For pro-status 
quo respondents, there is positive affect for those who share this position; the reported comfort 
level for similarly anti-independence neighbours is 79 (note that this score is lower than the 
aforementioned pro-independence advocates’ comfort with pro-independence neighbours, which 
was 93). At the same time, the comfort score for neighbours who show the Spanish flag is 77; this 
score is not statistically different from the comfort score towards those who are anti-independence. 
For the status quo advocates, their comfort for hypothetical pro-independence neighbours drops 
below the mid-point level to 32 (p<0.001). The comfort score for hypothetical neighbours who 
show the Catalan flag is statistically indistinct from this score, at 29. Thus, there is no difference 
for status quo advocates between comfort with neighbours who are supportive of an opposing 
position and those who are outwardly demonstrative of it.20 We note that when comparing pro-
independence and pro-status quo supporters, the latter show lower baseline comfort regarding their 
own policy supporters and flag-flyers as well as slightly lower baseline comfort for the opposing policy 
supporters and flag-flyers (relative to pro-independence supporters).  
The middle panel, showing the results for those who support greater autonomy, reveals that such 
individuals have less affective polarization on the issue. These individuals do not differentiate in 
comfort assessments based on independence position, nor based on intensity of preferences. 
Across all treatments, the comfort score is consistently in the fifties and there are no statistically 
 
20 Table B1 displays the regression results where the coefficient of interest in the baseline OLS specification is the 
interaction term between treatment assignment x independence view.  
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significant differences across the groups. This group feels similarly comfortable around the four 
different types of neighbours and does not differentiate among them.  
These results indicate clear polarization over the secessionist issue, as pro-independence and pro-
status quo supporters view the other side with less comfort and are far more comfortable with 
like-minded individuals. There is also relatively little difference in how each of these sides views 
people with more intense policy preferences (as proxied by flag display). Pro-independence 
individuals view potential independence flag-hanging individuals with the same comfort as they 
do fellow independence supporters; the equanimity in comfort holds for pro-status quo 
individuals. Thus, conditional on having a particular territorial view, having a neighbour with a 
public display of a like-minded view is not any less discomforting, an indication of polarization. 
However, those who support an intermediate policy position have the same, medium-level, 
comfort level with all groups. Figure 1 and Table C2 also show the over-time stability of the results 
of this experiment; the level of polarization is consistent.21 
5.2 Experiment 2: affect based on policy positions vs. group affiliations 
We now turn to an additional test of affective polarization, which is whether people who have a 
position on the independence issue have stereotypes of others with similar or different views, and 
whether such stereotyping extends to affiliated language groups.  
We ask respondents to assess how well various character traits apply to fellow citizens, focusing 
on evaluations of individuals who hold similar or opposing independence views (as in the previous 
experiment), but we also compare such evaluations with associated language groups. We give 
respondents the opportunity to stereotype people holding particular policy views or speaking a 
particular language, and compare the stereotyping of people with independence views with that of 
people who speak Catalan or Spanish at home. To do so, we randomly assign respondents to one 
of four experimental groups, the groups being assigned to evaluate people who (1) are pro-Catalan 
independence; (2) are anti-Catalan independence; (3) speak mainly Catalan at home; (4) speak 
mainly Spanish at home. The main question text asks individuals to rate how well various adjectives 
characterize people who either hold a particular independence position or speak a certain language 
(depending on which group they are assigned to).22 For each adjective, we classify binary responses 
whereby 1 = the trait describes the group extremely or very well and 0 = all other responses. For 
each respondent we sum the binary indicators for the positive traits and subtract the binary 
indicators of the negative traits, to create a net positive evaluation score. The range is thus from -3 
to 3.23 We then rescale the measure 0 to 1, with 1 indicating maximum positive evaluation and 0 
 
21 Tables C4 and C5 present the regression results of the second wave (weighted by gender and age category); these 
are very similar to the unweighted results.  
22 The question format has been applied in other contexts on group stereotyping (for one application in the US 
partisan context, see Iyengar et al. 2012): ‘Now we would like you to describe as best as you can what traits you think 
best describe people who [strongly support Catalan independence / strongly believe that Catalonia should be part of 
Spain / speak mostly Catalan at home / speak mostly Spanish at home]. Of course, it is difficult to generalize, but we 
would like you to describe them as best as you can.’ The traits asked about were: open-minded, prejudiced, honest, 
selfish, reliable, untrustworthy—thus three generally positive and three negative traits. The response options were: not 
well at all, slightly well, somewhat well, very well, and extremely well. 
23 We code ‘very well’ or ‘extremely well’ as one and the rest zero for each adjective to indicate that the respondent 
positively or negatively stereotypes, to facilitate generating an index. For example, if a respondent gives a rating for all 
adjectives of ‘very well’ or ‘extremely well’, then the net evaluation is (3-3) = 0, i.e. a ‘neutral’ evaluation (given that 
the respondent believes that all positive and negative traits describe the hypothetical group equally well). If a 
respondent rates all positive adjectives as describing the group very or extremely well, and all negative adjectives as 
somewhat well to not well at all, then the net score is 3, the maximum positive evaluation of the group. We also code 
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indicating maximum negative evaluation.24 Willingness to ascribe negative characteristics to people 
who have different territorial preferences would indicate polarization based on independence 
views, but we also wish to assess whether individuals who hold certain policy positions engage in 
stereotyping of certain groups.  
The main quantity of interest is how individuals who have different independence views differ in 
their assessments of these groups. This is done by comparing the net evaluation scores of each 
treatment group, again sub-setting by the theoretically fundamental subgroups of pro-
independence, pro-status quo, and pro-autonomy supporters.25 Within each subgroup we report 
difference of means tests across the four treatment groups.26 In Figure 2, we present the results 
for the two waves of the survey.  
Figure 2: Evaluation of personality traits, by territorial preferences (3 groups) 
Source: authors’ construction. 
The differences across the groups are quite large (all differences are statistically significant at 
p<.001), indicating that territorial views can strongly condition evaluations of those with 
(dis)similar preferences, as well as evaluations of those who speak different languages at home. 
The left panel of the figure shows that individuals who are pro-independence evaluate very 
 
those individuals who might wish not to stereotype by generating a separate indicator for those who answer the same 
for every adjective. Less than 4 per cent of respondents gave the same answer for every trait (indicating a possible 
aversion to stereotyping); dropping them does not change the results.  
24 The mean net evaluation across all groups is .59 (thus an overall positive score across the whole sample), with a 
standard deviation of .29. 
25 For space reasons we do not present results where we compare just two groups of independence supporters across 
the three experiments (supporters and the rest), but they can be found in Tables B1 and B2 for interested readers.  
26 Table C1 displays the regression results where the coefficient of interest in the baseline OLS specification is the 
interaction term between treatment assignment x independence view. In the regression tables B1 and B2, we also 
present aggregated results by treatment assignment, but given that the comparison of interest is assessment of traits 




positively fellow independence supporters (a score of .84). But there is no statistically significant 
difference between evaluations by independence supporters of fellow supporters and of those who 
speak Catalan at home, as the net evaluation of the latter group is also high (.82). Independence 
supporters have a much lower evaluation of anti-independence people (.32), and their assessment 
of Spanish speakers is between these two groups at .56. Thus, individuals who support 
independence do differentiate in their personal evaluations of people in different groups, assessing 
fellow supporters and Catalan speakers similarly, with lower assessments of Spanish speakers, and 
making the most negative assessments of those with anti-independence positions. Among 
independence supporters, then, there is a strong conflation between a particular language or ethnic 
group and the policy position. 
The right side of the figure shows similar results for those who support the status quo or prefer 
less autonomy. Those individuals have much higher evaluations of anti-independence people 
relative to pro-independence people (.69 vs. .28), and the difference between their evaluations of 
anti-independence people and Spanish speakers is slight (.69 vs. .74, p<.10). Their evaluations of 
the associated language ‘out-group’, Catalan speakers, is lower, at .53. The general stereotype-
preference ordering of pro-status quo individuals across the four groups is similar to that of pro-
independence individuals. 
The middle panel of Figure 2 displays the experimental results for those who prefer greater 
autonomy but not independence. The stark result is that there are much smaller differences in 
these individuals’ evaluations of the four groups. Pro-autonomy individuals do not differentiate 
between anti- and pro-independence groups (.47 vs. .50), nor between Catalan and Spanish 
speakers (.68 vs. .66). A notable contrast between these individuals and supporters of the two ends 
of the policy spectrum is that pro-autonomy individuals consistently rate members of language 
groups much higher than those holding particular policy positions, regardless of the policy or 
language group. Such individuals thus have an aversion to the negative stereotyping of members 
of language groups.  
These results taken overall corroborate our hypotheses and are consistent with the results of the 
‘neighbours’ experiment. Regarding the follow-up wave, as Figure 2 and Table C3 also show, there 
is high diachronic stability of the stereotyping across all treatment groups. This combined evidence 
within Wave 2 indicates that in September 2018 the polarization around the independence issue 
that we had captured in December 2017 was still in place.27  
5.3 Benchmarking  
Is polarization over independence distinct from that of other issues? While the theoretical focus 
here is the consequence of secession, a reasonable question is whether policy-based stereotyping 
is a more general phenomenon. To benchmark our effects and provide a robustness check, in the 
second wave of the survey we included additional policy questions that allowed us to compare 
polarization over independence to polarization over other issues that are also likely to be divisive. 
We essentially replicated the second experiment but instead of polarization over independence, we 
considered polarization over two other issues. We focused on the traditional divide that has 
structured political competition in Europe (the conflict over the role of the state in the economy), 
and one policy issue that is salient in European politics and increasingly so in Spain (immigration).28  
 
27 We find inconclusive and null results of moderators of education and length of independence support on affect 
evaluations; these moderators were not discussed in the PAPs. The results are available upon request. 
28 Fiscal and migration issues are increasingly polarizing Spanish society. See, for example, Miller (2020).  
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Early in the survey, we assessed respondents’ views on immigration and state intervention, and 
coded them as supporting or opposing immigration, or supporting or opposing state intervention. 
Later in the survey we measured the dependent variable as in the stereotype treatment, only we 
asked about views of people who have particular opinions on immigration and state intervention.29 
For the immigration trait assessment, we randomly assign the respondent with .5 probability to 
one of the following questions: ‘Now we would like you to describe as best as you can what traits 
you think best describe people who believe that immigration laws and policies should be [more / 
less] restrictive so that people from poorer countries find it [harder / easier] to settle in our country. 
Of course, it is difficult to generalize, but we would like you to describe as best as you can.’ The 
traits listed are the same as those asked in Experiment 2, with the same coding procedures followed 
to generate a net positive evaluation score. For the state intervention trait assessment, we 
conducted the exact same design, but asked instead about ‘people who believe that the state should 
intervene [more / less] in the economy with taxes and regulations.’  
Our comparison of net trait evaluations for the Catalan independence issue and language groups 
with net trait evaluations on the immigration and state intervention issues is depicted in Figure 3.  
Figure 3: Evaluation of personality traits, by policy preferences (2 groups), Wave 2 
Source: authors’ construction. 
The figure shows that, while there is of course some polarization regarding both immigration views 
and state intervention views, the degree of polarization for these policy issues is somewhat less 
than that for the independence issue, and in some cases more than that of polarization regarding 
evaluations of language groups.30 This comparison is most relevant if we consider people at 
different ends of the independence spectrum. For example, for pro-independence individuals, the 
 
29 The text of the immigration question reads, ‘How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? 
“Immigration laws and policies should be more restrictive so that people from poorer countries find it harder to settle 
in our country”?’ The text of the state intervention question reads, ‘How much do you agree or disagree with the 
following statement: “The state should intervene more in the economy with taxes and regulations in order to achieve 
a fairer society”?’ Response options and coding are the same as for Experiment 2. These questions were located at 
disparate points in the survey. 
30 Note that here the baseline category to assess stereotyping in the language dimension is the language of the 
respondent, not her policy preferences as in Figure 2. 
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difference in net evaluations of fellow pro- versus anti-independence individuals is about .51; this 
is greater than the difference in how pro-immigration individuals view those who are pro- and 
anti-immigration (.40). But, if we compare the other relevant benchmark of evaluations by pro-
independence people of the two language groups, while there is a difference of about .19 (the 
difference in pro-independence people’s evaluations of Catalan versus Spanish speakers), this 
difference is less than the gap for pro-immigration individuals’ net evaluations. We note, however, 
from our test that anti-immigration individuals do not view pro- versus anti-immigration 
individuals differently, and thus for all comparisons pro- and anti-independence individuals have 
more polarized views than anti-immigration individuals. We obtain similar results regarding 
polarization along support for state intervention: independence polarization is substantively 
greater than polarization over state intervention, and state intervention polarization is greater than 
that of attitudes towards language groups.31  
6 Discussion 
While much research on civil conflict documents the role of polarization in escalating or 
prolonging such conflict, a constructivist approach to studying relevant affective polarization ‘as 
it happens’ is empirically difficult. In the secession literature, there is little measurement of social 
polarization in places where such movements are salient but high-intensity violence has not (yet) 
occurred. In this article, we propose straightforward hypotheses of why and which individuals are 
likely to polarize along secessionist lines, and design and test these in a salient case. The results of 
our two-wave survey and embedded experiments indicate polarization around the secessionist 
issue in Catalonia, which we measure by comfort and affect towards people who hold similar or 
different positions, and affect towards associated language groups.32 The results of our second 
survey wave also show that there is persistence in such division. The claims and findings in this 
article have broad implications for the comparative study of secessionism, conflict, and group 
polarization.33 Our findings also provide crucial evidence that connects claims about the 
demographic structure of a society, polarization, and conflict. This is a contribution, given that 
such claims rely on affect towards the in-group versus the out-group.  
We emphasize that we are not claiming that the secessionist movement caused social polarization, 
as such a claim would require detailed over-time data on the measures described here, which do 
not exist.34 Nor do we contest that individual ethnic or nationalist sentiments may be explaining 
both secessionist drives and discriminatory attitudes. We show that the policy of secession, once 
pursued, can create a form of identity that has social spillovers in terms of affect and stereotyping. 
Further, this polarization displays over-time persistence and is greater than that of standard, non-
territorial-oriented policy disagreements. However, we also show that those with intermediate 
policy views (i.e. moderates) have smaller differences in affect towards people with distinct 
 
31 Table E1 displays these estimation results.  
32 This finding is consistent with what Criado et al. (2018) find regarding the effect of independentist mobilization on 
trust among Catalan university students belonging to different language groups. 
33 For a similar study regarding the polarizing effect of the Brexit referendum, see Hobolt et al. (forthcoming). 
34 There are no data on stereotyping prior to 2017 except for one survey commissioned by the Centro de 
Investigaciones Sociologicas in 1994 (CIS Study 2123), but this study does not capture the relevant stereotyping in 
Catalonia that is the subject of this study and is not longitudinal. 
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territorial views (and people that are members of different language groups) and are less prone to 
stereotyping those with such differences.  
Regarding scope conditions, our results could be applicable to cases in which, as in the case of 
Spain, secessionist movements are met with countermanding responses from the state. We would 
expect less polarization in cases in which the state is more open to accommodation to secessionists’ 
demands (for example, the case of Scotland in the United Kingdom prior to Brexit). Nonetheless, 
social polarization could also be measured in these latter contexts and set in comparison with the 
former. 
Another key conclusion of our research is the relevance of homogeneity within blocs of support 
for or opposition to secession. We find that the pro-independence bloc in Catalonia is internally 
much more homogeneous than the anti-independence bloc. The anti-independence bloc includes 
those who want Catalonia to have more autonomy within Spain and those who want to either 
maintain the status quo or reduce the autonomy of Catalonia. We find that the latter subgroup 
displays similar patterns to the pro-independence group, showing some symmetry in social 
polarization between two more extreme positions. The middle (i.e. pro-autonomy) group does not 
exhibit the same patterns of social polarization as the other two. Much of the existing literature on 
polarization in cross-national conflict studies ignores the fact that individuals may identify with 
more than one group or may have ambivalent preferences towards secessionist and unionist 
movements (Hierro and Gallego 2018). Critically, the consequences of polarization may depend 
on the direction of such cross-pressured individuals (Muñoz and Tormos 2015; Rodón and 
Guinjoan 2018). As per Mason’s perspective on the rise of US partisan polarization, while such 
individuals currently have cross-cutting identities, further government actions may change the 
relative weight of these identities and group sorting. Both the events around the October 2017 
referendum and the October 2019 riots and concerns about civil unrest in Catalonia speak to the 
relevance of government actions in affecting this middle group of citizens (Balcells et al. 2020; 
Barceló 2018). Furthermore, our results suggest that the preferences and views of an intermediate 
group may help explain the lack of escalation and ‘negative’ cases of conflict. 
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Appendix A: Descriptive statistics and baseline preferences 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max % 
Wave 1       
Female 2,537     48.88% 
Age 2,537 43.85 14.60 18 85  
Education_1 2,537     5.91% 
Education_2 2,537     37.64% 
Education_3 2,537     56.44% 
Language Catalan 2,537     36.30% 
Language Spanish 2,537     33.50% 
Language Catalan&Spanish 2,537     25.70% 
Household Size 2,537 2.79 1.16 1 9  
Income 2,537 2,612.34 1,370.42 0 5,500  
Employed 2,537     65.94% 
Catalan Identity 2,537 6.83 2.55 1 10  
Catalan Republic 2,537     44.42% 
More Autonomy 2,537     35.55% 
Status Quo 2,537     16.63% 
Less Autonomy 2,537     3.39% 
Wave 2       
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max % 
Female 1,721     47.30% 
Age 1,721 46.53 14.40 18 86  
Education_1 1,676     5.07% 
Education_2 1,676     37.77% 
Education_3 1,676     57.16% 
Language Catalan 1,676     37.77% 
Language Spanish 1,676     32.58% 
Language Catalan&Spanish 1,676     25.78% 
Household Size 1,676 2.75 1.14 1 9  
Income 1,721 2,545.58 1,354.91 0 5,500  
Employed 1,721     93.43% 
Catalan Identity 1,721 6.74 2.72 0 10  
Catalan Republic 1,721     46.54% 
More Autonomy 1,721     33% 
Status Quo 1,721     15.28% 
Less Autonomy 1,721     5.17% 
Support Immigration 1,721     55.20% 




Table A2: Correlates of territorial preferences, Wave 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Female -0.025* -0.028*** -0.14* -0.26*** 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.078) (0.093) 
Age category     
Age 35–44 -0.013 -0.024* -0.061 -0.24* 
 (0.020) (0.014) (0.11) (0.13) 
Age 45–54 -0.049** -0.069*** -0.25** -0.62*** 
 (0.020) (0.015) (0.11) (0.13) 
Age 55+ -0.0031 -0.056*** -0.013 -0.54*** 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.10) (0.13) 
Inc quintile     
Quintile 2 0.049** 0.019 0.24** 0.16 
 (0.022) (0.016) (0.12) (0.14) 
Quintile 3 0.050** 0.013 0.27** 0.100 
 (0.022) (0.016) (0.12) (0.14) 
Quintile 4 0.032 0.0046 0.19 0.025 
 (0.023) (0.017) (0.13) (0.15) 
Quintile 5 0.037 0.017 0.17 0.16 
 (0.024) (0.017) (0.13) (0.16) 
Unemployed -0.0095 -0.012 -0.059 -0.035 
 (0.027) (0.020) (0.15) (0.18) 
High educ 0.015 0.016 0.093 0.13 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.083) (0.098) 
Family origins     
Born in Cat/parents not 0.15*** -0.016 0.73*** -0.12 
 (0.022) (0.017) (0.12) (0.14) 
Born in Cat/1 parent 0.26*** 0.017 1.30*** 0.14 
 (0.021) (0.016) (0.11) (0.14) 
All born in Cat 0.38*** 0.014 2.05*** 0.072 
 (0.019) (0.015) (0.11) (0.14) 
Catalan ID      
Cat ID 2nd quintile  0.12***  1.07*** 
  (0.031)  (0.27) 
Cat ID 3rd quintile  0.29***  2.27*** 
  (0.022)  (0.22) 
Cat ID 4th quintile  0.65***  4.67*** 
  (0.024)  (0.24) 
Cat ID 5th quintile  0.84***  6.80*** 
  (0.024)  (0.27) 
_cons 0.38*** 0.13***   
 (0.025) (0.024)   
cut1   -0.34** 1.18*** 
   (0.14) (0.23) 
cut2   1.51*** 4.28*** 
   (0.14) (0.25) 
N 2,519 2,519 2,519 2,519 
R2 0.161 0.570   
Note: standard errors in parentheses. Models 1–2 OLS estimation. Models 3–4 ordered logistic estimation.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Source: authors’ construction. 
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Table A2 presents correlates of territorial preferences. As noted in the main text, the dependent 
variable is support for status quo or less autonomy, more autonomy, or independence. Columns 
1–2 present OLS estimations where the territorial preferences (status quo or less autonomy, more 
autonomy, independence) are recoded 0–1 (0=status quo or less, .5=more autonomy, 
1=independence). Columns 3–4 present ordered logistic estimations. All models consider the role 
of female gender, education (coded as at least some post-secondary schooling 1 and the rest 0), 
age group (18–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55+), unemployment status, income quintile, and family origin. 
For family origin, we use binary indicators of the following categories: respondent and both 
parents born outside Catalonia, respondent born in Catalonia and both parents outside, 
respondent and one parent born in Catalonia, and both parents and respondent born in Catalonia. 
Unless otherwise noted, all variables are coded as binary indicators of each level, with the lowest 
level set as the baseline.  
Models 2 and 4 consider the additional role of self-identified Catalan versus Spanish identity; this 
was assessed on a 1–10 scale with higher values indicating more Catalan self-identification. We 
display quintiles of this variable. Self-professed Catalan identification is strongly correlated with 
greater autonomy and independence preferences. Once this variable is controlled for, family origin 
is no longer precisely estimated. We caution of course that self-professed identification might be 
the result of territorial preferences.  
The ordered-logit models indicate that intermediate Catalan identity (quintile 3) is strongly 
correlated with support for the intermediate autonomy option; with the other demographic 
variables at means the predicted probability of this option is .6 (that of independence support is .1 




Appendix B: Estimation results, Wave 1 
Table B1: OLS regression showing moderating effect of independence and treatment assignment on affect 
towards hypothetical neighbours, Wave 1 














Pro-independence neighbours 11.3*** -16.2*** 0.13 
 (1.78) (1.99) (2.32) 
Independentist flag neighbours 11.4*** -17.5*** 1.46 
 (1.80) (2.05) (2.41) 
Spanish flag neighbours -5.47*** -2.77 -4.57* 
 (1.82) (2.04) (2.39) 
Pro-independence (PI)  -19.6*** -12.41*** 
  (2.17) (2.26) 
PI*Pro-independence neighbours  63.5*** 47.17*** 
  (3.02) (3.15) 
PI*Independentist flag neighbours   63.01*** 44.06*** 
  (3.04) (3.20) 
PI*Spanish flag neighbours  -6.38** -4.58 
  (3.07) (3.22) 
Support status quo (SQ)   -20.99*** 
   (2.88) 
SQ*Pro-independence neighbours   46.7*** 
   (3.93) 
SQ*Independentist flag neighbours   -51.9*** 
   (4.01) 
SQ*Spanish flag neighbours   3.15 
   (4.00) 
Constant 56.1*** 64.9*** 57.6*** 
 (1.28) (1.44) (1.68) 
N 2,551 2,551 2,551 
R2 0.049 0.332 0.411 
Note: standard errors in parentheses. N for each treatment group is: 621 (anti-independence), 664 (pro-
independence), 633 (display Catalan flags), 619 (display Spanish flags). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 




Table B2: OLS regression showing moderating effect of independence and treatment assignment on affect 
towards individuals supporting policies and associated language groups, Wave 1 













Evaluate pro-independence -0.030** -0.27*** -0.16*** 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.021) 
Evaluate anti-independence -0.19*** -0.13*** -0.19*** 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.022) 
Evaluate Catalan speaker 0.078*** -0.064*** 0.018 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.021) 
Pro-independence (PI)  -0.13*** -0.10*** 
  (0.019) (0.020) 
PI*Evaluate pro-independence  0.56*** 0.44*** 
  (0.027) (0.029) 
PI*Evaluate anti-independence  -0.11*** -0.055* 
  (0.027) (0.029) 
PI*Evaluate Catalan speaker  0.33*** 0.24*** 
  (0.027) (0.029) 
Support status quo (SQ)   0.084*** 
   (0.026) 
SQ*Evaluate pro-independence   -0.31*** 
   (0.036) 
SQ*Evaluate anti-independence   0.13*** 
   (0.037) 
SQ*Evaluate Catalan speaker   -0.23*** 
   (0.036) 
Constant 0.63*** 0.68*** 0.66*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) 
N 2,551 2,551 2,551 
R2 0.111 0.324 0.372 
Note: standard errors in parentheses. N for each treatment group is: 623 (pro-independence), 647 (anti-
independence), 618 (speak Catalan), 649 (speak Spanish). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 




Appendix C: Descriptive statistics and estimation results, Wave 1 vs Wave 2 
Table C1: Differences between waves in key moderator (territorial views) and outcomes 












Independence position 0.02    
Pro-indy trait evaluation -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0 
Anti-indy trait evaluation 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.04 
Cat language speaker evaluation -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 
Span language speaker evaluation 0.004 0.02 0 0 
Pro-cat indy neighbours -2.3 -0.6 -3.9 -1 
Cat flag neighbours -0.3 -1.6 -5.8 2.7 
Anti-indy neighbours 1.4 1.6 3.2 1 
Span flag neighbours -2.7 1.2 -9.1 -2.8 
Support independence if minimal economic cost  -0.02   
Support independence if medium economic cost  0.01   
Support independence if high economic cost  -0.02   
Support independence if social cost  -0.01   
Prevent independence if minimal economic cost   0.02 -0.07 
Prevent independence if medium economic cost   -0.03 0 
Prevent independence if high economic cost   0.13 0 
Prevent independence if social cost   0.03 -0.07 
Note: table reports first difference of dependent variable outcomes by treatment group, with the latter 3 columns 
conditioning on individuals who had no change in independence position across sample (85% of sample). All 
variables are scaled 0–1 except for neighbour assessments, which are scaled 0–100. 
Source: authors’ construction. 
Table C2: Changes in comfort towards hypothetical neighbours between the two waves 













Pro-independence -3.67 0.35 -0.30 4.89 
 (2.72) (3.35) (2.42) (3.21) 
     
Pro-SQ -6.48* -4.15 -1.93 -4.45 
 (3.34) (4.30) (2.96) (3.93) 
     
Constant 2.02 -0.97 1.87 -3.73 
 (2.07) (2.58) (1.84) (2.44) 
N 390 391 394 371 
R2 0.010 0.003 0.001 0.018 
Note: standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 




Table C3: Change in people’s evaluation towards groups between the two waves 













Pro-independence -0.050* -0.036 -0.0072 0.020 
 (0.028) (0.038) (0.026) (0.027) 
Pro-status quo -0.053 -0.052 0.038 -0.0091 
 (0.033) (0.047) (0.033) (0.034) 
Constant 0.011 0.042 -0.041** 2.2e-10 
 (0.021) (0.030) (0.019) (0.020) 
N 379 405 368 394 
R2 0.010 0.004 0.006 0.003 
Note: standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 




Table C4: OLS regression showing moderating effect of independence and treatment assignment on affect 
towards hypothetical neighbours, Wave 2 (weighted results) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Comfort Comfort Comfort 
Pro-independence neighbours 15.4*** 8.60*** 9.38*** 
 (2.17) (3.09) (3.14) 
Independentist flag neighbours 15.4*** 8.55*** 9.85*** 
 (2.21) (3.24) (3.26) 
Spanish flag neighbours -6.61*** -1.81 -1.06 
 (2.09) (3.11) (3.15) 
Pro-independence (PI)  -11.0*** -10.5*** 
  (2.95) (3.00) 
PI*Pro-independence neighbours  39.6*** 38.9*** 
  (3.80) (3.87) 
PI*Independentist flag neighbours  40.4*** 39.0*** 
  (3.90) (3.93) 
PI*Spanish flag neighbours  -8.21** -8.70** 
  (4.12) (4.19) 
Support status quo (SQ)  20.4*** 20.2*** 
  (4.02) (4.06) 
SQ*Pro-independence neighbours  -54.6*** -54.5*** 
  (5.32) (5.37) 
SQ*Independentist flag neighbours  -58.3*** -59.9*** 
  (5.42) (5.47) 
SQ*Spanish flag neighbours  -6.61 -7.23 
  (5.80) (5.82) 
Female   2.06* 
   (1.22) 
Secondary educ   0.054 
   (3.26) 
Post-secondary   0.27 
   (3.27) 
Unemployed   1.05 
   (2.45) 
Income decile   0.39 
   (0.25) 
Born in Cat, parents not   -1.28 
   (2.10) 
Born in Cat, 1 parent also   -2.83 
   (1.98) 
Born in Cat, 2 parents also   -1.19 
   (1.80) 
_cons 52.9*** 54.2*** 51.7*** 
 (1.46) (2.22) (4.10) 
N 1,710 1,710 1,665 
R2 0.085 0.449 0.456 
Note: standard errors in parentheses. Main reference category for column 1 = ‘anti-independence neighbours’ 
treatment. Main reference categories for columns 2–3 = ‘anti-independence neighbour’ treatment category and 
‘support autonomy’ respondents. Reference categories for column 3 demographic variables are: male, primary-
education only, employed, not born in Catalonia. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Source: authors’ construction.  
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Table C5: OLS regression showing moderating effect of independence and treatment assignment on stereotyping 
of individuals supporting policies and associated language groups, Wave 2 (weighted results) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Net stereotype score Net stereotype score Net stereotype score 
Evaluate pro-independence -0.073*** -0.20*** -0.20*** 
 (0.021) (0.029) (0.029) 
Evaluate anti-independence -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.20*** 
 (0.019) (0.030) (0.030) 
Evaluate Catalan speaker 0.033** -0.0099 -0.011 
 (0.016) (0.026) (0.026) 
Pro-independence (PI)  -0.099*** -0.097*** 
  (0.024) (0.025) 
PI*Evaluate pro-independence  0.46*** 0.46*** 
  (0.036) (0.036) 
PI*Evaluate anti-independence  -0.048 -0.050 
  (0.039) (0.039) 
PI*Evaluate Catalan speaker  0.19*** 0.19*** 
  (0.035) (0.035) 
Support status quo (SQ)  0.11*** 0.10*** 
  (0.030) (0.030) 
SQ*Evaluate pro-independence  -0.35*** -0.35*** 
  (0.044) (0.044) 
SQ*Evaluate anti-independence  0.13*** 0.13*** 
  (0.046) (0.046) 
SQ*Evaluate Catalan speaker  -0.24*** -0.24*** 
  (0.044) (0.044) 
Female   0.025** 
   (0.012) 
Secondary educ   0.054 
   (3.26) 
Post-secondary   0.27 
   (3.27) 
Unemployed   0.014 
   (0.026) 
Income decile   0.0041* 
   (0.0022) 
Born in Cat, parents not   0.0015 
   (0.018) 
Born in Cat, 1 parent also   0.000078 
   (0.018) 
Born in Cat, 2 parents also   -0.010 
   (0.017) 
_cons 0.64*** 0.67*** 0.62*** 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.037) 
N 1,665 1,665 1,665 
R2 0.096 0.376 0.380 
Note: standard errors in parentheses. Main reference category for column 1 = ‘evaluate Spanish speakers’ 
treatment. Main reference categories for columns 2–3 = ‘evaluate Spanish speakers’ treatment category and 
‘support autonomy’ respondents. Reference categories for column 3 demographic variables are: male, primary-
education only, employed, not born in Catalonia. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 




Appendix D: Balance tests 
Table D1: Treatment assignment, neighbours’ experiment (Wave 1) 





Catalan flags Spanish flags 
Support auto 0.024 0.12 -0.15 0.0088 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 
Support SQ -0.097 0.069 -0.067 0.093 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Female 0.14 -0.20** 0.063 0.00011 
 (0.094) (0.092) (0.093) (0.094) 
Unemployed -0.095 -0.11 0.063 0.14 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Decile -0.0024 -0.028 0.012 0.019 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
Education 0.014 -0.011 0.048 -0.052 
 (0.081) (0.079) (0.081) (0.081) 
Constant -1.20*** -0.82*** -1.25*** -1.14*** 
 (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) 
N 2,519 2,519 2,519 2,519 
Note: standard errors in parentheses; ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 




Table D2: Treatment assignment, stereotypes experiment (Wave 1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pro-indy Anti-indy Speak Catalan Speak Spanish 
Support auto 0.021 -0.17 0.098 0.060 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) 
Support SQ 0.16 -0.17 0.16 -0.15 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) 
Female -0.14 0.019 0.082 0.037 
 (0.094) (0.093) (0.094) (0.093) 
Unemployed 0.20 0.13 -0.27 -0.087 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.18) 
Decile 0.0072 -0.0064 0.0079 -0.0082 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
Education -0.093 0.090 -0.023 0.024 
 (0.080) (0.081) (0.081) (0.080) 
Constant -0.91*** -1.18*** -1.21*** -1.09*** 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
N 2,519 2519 2,519 2,519 
Note: standard errors in parentheses; ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 




Appendix E: Benchmark tests, Wave 2 
Table E1: Stereotype evaluations by treatment effects, other policy areas (Wave 2) 
 (1) (2) 
 Immigration State intervention 
Support immigration -0.30***  
 (0.018)  
Treatment (pro-immigration) -0.00032  
 (0.019)  
Treatment*Support Imm 0.40***  
 (0.026)  
Support state intervention  -0.25*** 
  (0.028) 
Treatment (pro-state intervention)  -0.20*** 
  (0.034) 
Treatment*Support state intervention  0.45*** 
  (0.039) 
Constant 0.52*** 0.61*** 
 (0.013) (0.025) 
N 893 828 
R2 .19 .24 
Note: standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Source: authors’ construction. 
